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The world as it appears to the viewer is the result of a complex process of inference
performed by the brain. The validity of this apparently counter-intuitive assertion becomes
evident whenever we face noisy, feeble or ambiguous visual stimulation: in these
conditions, the state of the observer may play a decisive role in determining what is
currently perceived. On this background, ambiguous perception and its amenability to
top-down influences can be employed as an empirical paradigm to explore the principles
of perception. Here we offer an overview of both classical and recent contributions on
how stable and transient states of the observer can impact ambiguous perception. As
to the influence of the stable states of the observer, we show that what is currently
perceived can be influenced (1) by cognitive and affective aspects, such as meaning, prior
knowledge, motivation, and emotional content and (2) by individual differences, such as
gender, handedness, genetic inheritance, clinical conditions, and personality traits and
by (3) learning and conditioning. As to the impact of transient states of the observer,
we outline the effects of (4) attention and (5) voluntary control, which have attracted
much empirical work along the history of ambiguous perception. In the huge literature
on the topic we trace a difference between the observer’s ability to control dominance
(i.e., the maintenance of a specific percept in visual awareness) and reversal rate (i.e.,
the switching between two alternative percepts). Other transient states of the observer
that have more recently drawn researchers’ attention regard (6) the effects of imagery and
visual working memory. (7) Furthermore, we describe the transient effects of prior history
of perceptual dominance. (8) Finally, we address the currently available computational
models of ambiguous perception and how they can take into account the crucial share
played by the state of the observer in perceiving ambiguous displays.
Keywords: ambiguous perception, bistability, binocular rivalry, reversible figures, ambiguous
structure-from-motion (SFM), top-down control, modeling
INTRODUCTION
When a physical stimulus does not have a univocal perceptual
correspondence we may face two different kinds of illusory expe-
riences: first, the stimulus may be given a “mistaken” perceptual
interpretation, thus leading to stable illusions (as in the case of the
hollow-face illusion, where a concave mask is steadily perceived
as a convex face, Figure 1A). Second, mutually exclusive percepts
may alternate under the viewer’s eye: a phenomenon called
bistable or multistable perception. Strictly speaking, bistable
perception is triggered by a physical stimulus that allows for only
two alternative interpretations, whereas multistable perception is
observed in case of multiple possible alternatives (e.g., Kubovy,
1994). However, the two terms are often used synonymously in
the literature. Bistable perception comprises a wide range of illu-
sory phenomena: from reversible figures, where the stimulus con-
figuration enables multiple interpretations (e.g., Figures 1B,C),
to binocular rivalry (e.g., Figure 1D), where conflicting
monocular images are displayed separately to the two eyes.
Although the neural substrata underpinning different kinds of
ambiguous perception may be rather diverse, bistable perception
poses intriguing questions as to the issue of visual awareness,
in primis as to the degree to which we can control our con-
scious visual experience. Top-down influences on ambiguous
perception, however, can be exerted at different levels of per-
ceptual processing and across different timescales: for instance,
individual differences determined by the genes likely act at a phys-
iological level and their effect persists through a lifetime (and
beyond). Instead, the effects related to the voluntary deploy-
ment of attention likely act at a higher level of processing and
are of a more fleeting nature (Figure 2). Therefore, in the bulk
of studies devoted to the topic, we find it useful to trace a dis-
tinction between research on how stable and transient states of
the observer may affect the phenomenal appearance of bistable
objects. Stable states of the observer include manifold aspects,
ranging from the effects of prior knowledge and motivation to
those of individual and genetic differences. Instead, transient
manipulations of the state of the observer include the effects
of intention, imagery and working memory, which are achieved
via the exertion of an explicit cognitive effort, and the effects of
adaptation and prior history of perceptual dominance, which are
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of ambiguous stimuli. (A) Hollow-face illusion: a
concave mask looks like a convex face. (B) It is not possible to state which
side of the Necker Cube is facing the observer: perspective-based reversals
occur between two possible configurations of the cube. (C) Hill’s
Wife/Mother-in-law ambiguous figure: the image can be alternatively
perceived as a young or as an old lady. (D) Binocular rivalry: two different
monocular images are displayed to each eye, causing subjective perception
to alternate between the two. (E) Shape from shading: under the implicit
assumption that light comes from above in a scene, the shading pattern
becomes responsible for the perception of convexity or concavity of a visual
object. (F) The ambiguous point-light walker is a particular instance of
structure-from-motion (see G): when motion information is added to the
display, the dots are perceived as a walker facing toward or away from the
observer. (G) Static depiction of an ambiguously rotating
structure-from-motion sphere: when motion information is added to the
display, the stimulus is seen as a three-dimensional sphere and opposite
directions of motion alternate in perception. (H,I) Two instances of
ambiguous apparent motion: in the bistable motion quartet (H), single dots
displayed in succession at a fixed frame rate induce the impression of vertical
or horizontal translation. In (I), rather than perceiving two static dots of
different size being flashed at different positions on the screen, the viewer
perceives two dots exchanging positions (translation) or two dots expanding
and contracting at two separate locations. (J) When two drifting sinusoidal
gratings are superimposed, they can be perceived as either a coherently
moving plaid pattern or as two semi-transparent gratings moving on top of
each other in different directions.
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Box 1 | Glossary.
Phenomenon Figures Description References
Hollow-face illusion 1A A concave mask is perceived as a convex face. Gregory, 1997
Reversible figures 1B,C The stimulus configuration allows for multiple interpretations. Within
the category of reversible figures, a difference can be traced between
figures whose reversibility is based on reference frame re-alignment,
such as the Necker cube (1B, other instances are the Schröder
Staircase and the Reversible Book) and on meaning reconstruction,
such as the Wife/Mother-in-law ambiguous figure (1C, other instances
are Rubin’s vase/face and the duck/rabbit figure).
Long and Toppino, 2004
Binocular rivalry 1D It occurs when two different images are shown simultaneously to the
two eyes at a corresponding retinal location. Perception switches
between the monocular inputs, although phenomena of mixed
dominance are also possible (piecemeal rivalry).
Wheatstone, 1838; Levelt, 1968
Shape from shading 1E Objects are perceived as concave or convex depending on whether
the shading pattern is compatible with the scene being illuminated
from above.
Ramachandran, 1988
Ambiguous point-light
walker
1F A human walker can be defined only by dots placed at the main joints:
the dots configuration is immediately perceived as a walker as soon
as it starts moving (i.e., it is an instance of structure-form-motion, see
1G). Bistable point-light walkers are compatible with two
three-dimensional interpretations, dissimilar only for the depth order
of the body parts: a point-light walker in frontal view can appear to
face toward or away from the observer.
Vanrie et al., 2004; Manera
et al., 2012
Ambiguous
structure-from-motion
1G The stimulus consists of a two-dimensional projection of a
three-dimensional object (in this case a sphere), composed of dots
laying on its imaginary surface: when motion information is added to
the display, the stimulus is seen as a three-dimensional object and
opposite directions of motion alternate in perception.
Metzger, 1935
Ambiguous apparent
motion
1H,I The repetitive presentation of single dots at a fixed frame rate
induces the impression of motion: rather than perceiving static dots
flashing at different positions on the screen, the viewer perceives
them moving. The intermittent and subsequent presentation of four
dots induces the subjective impression of vertical or horizontal motion
in Figure 1H, whereas in Figure 1I the two dots may appear to
translate horizontally or to expand and contract (loom and recede)
Wertheimer, 1912; Suzuki and
Peterson, 2000; Kohler et al.,
2008
Plaid motion 1J When two drifting sinusoidal gratings are superimposed, the viewer
may perceive the motion of the single semi-transparent gratings.
Alternatively, what is perceived is a rigid structure (a plaid) drifting in a
direction determined by the velocity and direction of the components.
Adelson and Movshon, 1982
independent of the observer’s voluntary control. The influence
of stable and of transient states on ambiguous perception will be
covered, respectively in Section Stable States of the Observer and
Ambiguous Perception and Transient States of the Observer and
Ambiguous Perception.
As ambiguous displays have been employed as a paradigm to
investigate perception, and in particular the interplay between
the brain and the outside world in determining what is seen,
several theoretical models have been put forward to promote
our understanding of the determinants of perceptual bistability.
SectionModeling Ambiguous Perception: Toward Accounting for
the Impact of Stable and Transient States of the Observer will
be devoted to the theoretical advances in explaining the mecha-
nisms of top-downmodulation of bistable perception, taking into
account the role of both stable and transient states of the observer.
STABLE STATES OF THE OBSERVER AND AMBIGUOUS
PERCEPTION
COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE ASPECTS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
AMBIGUOUS DISPLAYS
The way humans perceive ambiguous stimuli can tell us a great
deal about what the visual system “expects” to see and what it
“likes” to see. Evolution and life-long learning build into our
nervous system knowledge about the world, both explicit and
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FIGURE 2 | Summary of the timeframes in which a few top-down
determinants of ambiguous perception can be observed. Phenomena
such as adaptation and attention typically dissipate within a window of a
few seconds whereas the effects of inheritable individual differences
linger on beyond the lifespan of a single individual. Blue and red lines
illustrate, respectively transient and stable influences of the state of the
observer on ambiguous perception, violet lines designate effects that
occur at an intermediate level. Dashed lines indicate timescales under
which the effects are plausibly taking place, but that have not been
investigated yet.
implicit. This knowledge is used to disambiguate stimuli which
would otherwise be ambiguous. Furthermore, the motivational
value and emotional relevance of a stimulus’ interpretation can
determine how likely it is to dominate when multiple mutually
exclusive percepts are possible. Perhaps the most striking example
of a situation where our visual system’s understanding of the
world imposes an interpretation of a stimulus which is physically
ambiguous is the hollow-face illusion (Gregory, 1970). The top-
down influence in this illusion is so strong that the hollow-face
is not bistable and invariably appears convex when the stimu-
lation is physically ambiguous (i.e., when viewed statically and
monocularly under diffuse illumination). Furthermore, the per-
cept of convexity is resistant to contrary sensory evidence from
motion parallax, binocular disparity and shading to a great extent.
The hollow-face illusion is intriguing also because it clarifies that
the semantic representation of the world which is built into our
visual system is partially independent from our general knowl-
edge. We are more likely to see a stimulus as convex if it is a
face and if it is upright (Hill and Johnston, 2007), indicating
that a relatively high level of processing is at the source of the
perceptual bias, yet, the same perceptual bias is not necessarily
overridden by the explicit knowledge that the object is concave
(e.g., Gregory, 1997). Notice however that there is evidence that
being told about the possible interpretations of an ambiguous
stimulus might promote its perceptual bistability (Girgus et al.,
1977). Another well-known example of knowledge built into our
visual system is the assumption that scenes are illuminated from
above and by a single light source (e.g., Ramachandran, 1988).
Objects are usually perceived as concave or convex as soon as this
geometrical structure predicts a shading pattern compatible with
the scene being illuminated from above (Figure 1E). The dom-
inant percept cannot be easily overridden voluntarily, however,
perceptual bistability can emerge if a single light source cannot
be the determinant of the global pattern of shading (Papathomas
and Gorea, 1990).
Besides favoring one interpretation of an ambiguous stimu-
lus above another, the semantics of a visual object can have an
impact on its access to awareness when it competes with other
stimuli. This has been shown in the case of binocular rivalry,
where meaningful stimuli tend to dominate over abstract stim-
uli (Yu and Blake, 1992) and coherent scenes have been found
to dominate over incoherent ones (Mudrik et al., 2011). Notice
however that the dominance duration of structurally impossible
objects can be longer than the one of normal objects, and the
dominance duration of non-words can exceed the one of words
(Wolf and Hochstein, 2011): this indicates that expectancy vio-
lations might gain privileged access to awareness. Apart from
their meaningfulness, stimuli might dominate in bistable displays
because they are more desirable, a phenomenon which has been
called “wishful seeing” (Dunning and Balcetis, 2013). Observers
are more likely to report a percept to which a reward is associ-
ated both in ambiguous figures and in binocular rivalry (Balcetis
and Dunning, 2006; Balcetis et al., 2012) and thirsty subjects are
more likely to report transparency, which is an attribute of water
(Changizi and Hall, 2001). The emotional relevance of stimuli has
a more complex effect on their dominance in ambiguous displays.
Emotional faces (Coren and Russell, 1992; Alpers and Gerdes,
2007) as well as emotional scenes (Alpers and Pauli, 2006) tend to
dominate in binocular rivalry. However, using stimuli controlled
for arousal and emotional valence (Lang et al., 2005), Sheth and
Pham (2008) found that arousing stimuli tend to dominate when
valence is equal. Instead, stimuli with positive valence (i.e., pleas-
ant) tend to dominate at low arousal levels, while negative images
dominate among high-arousal stimuli.
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Observers can show consistent inter-individual differences in the
way they perceive bistable displays. Differences in one’s life-long
experience and genetic profile contribute to different switch rates
and idiosyncratic biases favoring one percept over another in
healthy subjects, and various clinical conditions can be associ-
ated with altered patterns of bistable perception. We first review
some examples of studies investigating individual differences
in bistable perception within the general population and then
consider studies dedicated to clinical populations.
The rate at which perception oscillates between the differ-
ent interpretations of a bistable stimulus is a highly stable and
inheritable attribute of an observer. A study of monozygotic
and dizygotic twins suggested that 52% of the between-observer
variance in the rate of switching in binocular rivalry can be
attributed to genetic factors (Miller et al., 2010). A similar pat-
tern of inheritability can be observed for the switch rate in the
perception of the Necker cube (Shannon et al., 2011). An indi-
vidual’s rate of switching when viewing bistable displays can
also correlate with other stable traits. A first example of such
a trait is handedness. Christman et al. (2009) compared the
perception of ambiguous figures in strong right-handers and
mixed-handers. Mixed-handers showed a higher rate of sponta-
neous reversals and switched their percept more readily as the
evidence in favor of one interpretation increased. The increased
strength of interhemispheric connections associated with mixed-
handedness might contribute to the faster switching of bistable
perception. Indeed, pathologies in the development of callosal
connections have been associated with a lower reversal rate of
ambiguous figures in children (Fagard et al., 2008). Some indi-
vidual differences in bistable perception can be connected to other
anatomical features including the structure of parietal cortex. In
particular the gray matter density in the right superior parietal
lobule has been found to correlate with an observer’s switch rate
when viewing ambiguous structure-from-motion (SFM) stimuli
(Kanai et al., 2010, 2011). However, a larger share of the inter-
individual differences in bistable perception might be associated
with the functioning of neurotransmitter systems. It has long been
known that psychoactive drugs have an effect on bistable percep-
tion (e.g., George, 1936), and there is now converging evidence
for a role of dopaminergic, GABAergic and serotoninergic sys-
tems. Dopamine antagonist chlorpromazine reduces the reversal
rate of ambiguous figures (Phillipson and Harris, 1984) and part
of the inheritance pattern of the individual differences in rever-
sal rate when viewing ambiguous SFM stimuli might be related to
genes associated with dopaminergic transmission (Schmack et al.,
2013). Van Loon et al. (2013) recently showed that higher concen-
trations of GABA in visual cortex are related to slower switch rates
both in binocular rivalry and in ambiguous SFM stimuli, and
GABAA agonist Lorazepam induces a reduction in the switch rate.
The rate of switching in binocular rivalry can also be modulated
by the administration of serotonergic drugs (Carter et al., 2005a,b,
2007; Nagamine et al., 2008) and altered serotoninergic transmis-
sion, as well as accelerated binocular rivalry, have been reported
in anxious individuals, although the relationship between the two
manifestations might be quite complex (Nagamine et al., 2007,
2008).
Besides inter-individual differences in switch rate, observers
can differ in their biases to perceive one particular interpreta-
tion of a bistable display (Mamassian and Wallace, 2010). Biases
in bistable perception can be associated with various permanent
characteristics of the observer. One example is gender. Schouten
et al. (2010) investigated how male and female observers perceive
ambiguous point-light walkers, structure-from-motion displays
which can appear to face toward or away from the observer
(Figure 1F). They found that a walker of a given gender was more
likely to be perceived as facing the viewer by observers belong-
ing to the same gender. Moreover, in general male observers were
more likely to perceive a gender-neutral walker to face them as
compared to female observers. The observer’s gender also has
more subtle consequences in the ambiguous point-light walker
task, as evidenced by the fact that male observers are more sen-
sitive to perspective cues disambiguating the facing direction
(Schouten et al., 2013). Another trait which can be associated with
a bias in perceiving point-light walkers is social anxiety (Van De
Cruys et al., 2013). Observers with high social anxiety are more
likely to report seeing the walkers pointing away from them as
compared to individuals with lower social anxiety. Under those
conditions, observers with high anxiety appear to be biased to
perceive the less threatening interpretation of the bistable stimu-
lus. The opposite bias however can be observed under different
conditions. In particular, Gray et al. (2009) reported that anx-
ious observers were more likely to report a face with a threatening
expression as the first percept in binocular rivalry.
Multiple pathological conditions can be associated with altered
perception of bistable stimuli. An abnormal pattern of bistable
perception can be related to disturbances in basic aspects of the
functioning of the central nervous system. In some psychiatric
conditions, however, the disturbances are specifically related to
the meaning or affective value of the bistable stimuli. One exam-
ple of the first category is the aforementioned reduction in the
reversal rate of ambiguous figures in children with agenesis of
the corpus callosum (Fagard et al., 2008). Adults with autism
have also been reported to exhibit altered dynamics in binoc-
ular rivalry. Specifically, autistic adults reported mixed percepts
for longer times and had lower switch rates compared to healthy
observers (Robertson et al., 2013). A similar pattern has been
described for migraine patients (Wilkinson et al., 2008), who also
exhibit less frequent perceptual switches when testedmonocularly
with rivalrous plaidmotion stimuli (Mckendrick et al., 2011). The
lower switch rate in migraine patients could be related to reduced
serotonin levels in sensory cortex. Perhaps the most clearly estab-
lished link between a clinical condition and bistable perception
is the case of the reduced alternation rate in binocular rivalry
in patients with bipolar disorder (Pettigrew and Miller, 1998;
Miller et al., 2003; Vierck et al., 2013), and specifically in patients
with bipolar I disorder (Nagamine et al., 2009). “Sticky” binocu-
lar rivalry is so evidently associated with bipolar disorder that it
has been suggested as a possible endophenotype of the pathology
(Ngo et al., 2011). The reduction in reversal rate is present albeit
less prominent also when patients with bipolar disorder are tested
in an ambiguous SFM (see Figure 1G) task (Krug et al., 2008).
Examples where disturbances of bistable perception emerge
as a function of the cognitive attributes of the stimuli include a
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possible reduction in the rate of spontaneous switches in chil-
dren with autism spectrum disorder while viewing ambiguous
figures (Sobel et al., 2005), which has been attributed to a gen-
eral deficit in executive functioning, although the evidence in this
respect is not univocal (Ropar et al., 2003; Wimmer and Doherty,
2010). Disturbances related to the emotional valence of bistable
stimuli have been described in generalized social anxiety disorder.
Patients affected by this disorder tend to have shorter dominance
duration in binocular rivalry for smiling faces as compared to
healthy observers and patients with generalized anxiety disor-
der, consistent with a reduced sensitivity to positive social cues
(Anderson et al., 2013). Patients with generalized social anxiety
disorder have also been reported to have a bias to perceive fear-
ful faces as the first percept in binocular rivalry, although they
tend to maintain the fearful percept for a shorter time as com-
pared to neutral faces (Singer et al., 2009). Generally speaking,
it appears that individuals with pathological levels of social anxi-
ety tend to preferentially perceive stimuli associated with positive
social interactions. This pattern bears resemblance with the afore-
mentioned tendency to preferentially perceive the less threatening
interpretation of social stimuli in healthy individuals with high
social anxiety (Van De Cruys et al., 2013).
LEARNING EFFECTS
Our perception of ambiguous stimuli can be shaped by innate
properties of our visual system and by our life-long experience.
It is however also possible to show robust learning effects in
ambiguous perception within the limited time frame of a psy-
chophysical experiment. The choice of presenting learning effects
in the section devoted to the stable characteristic of the observer
is somehow arbitrary, as their lifetime can be very diverse and
vary according to the characteristics of the observer and of the
experimental paradigm. However, since there is experimental evi-
dence for learning effects that last over 4 weeks, we decided to
deal with their impact on ambiguous perception in this section.
The question of how learning can shape perception is a long-lived
one (e.g., Ammons, 1954), and evidence for learning effects in
ambiguous perception emerged relatively early. A longstanding
finding (Brown, 1955; Spitz and Lipman, 1962; Long et al., 1983)
is that the reversal rate of a spinning ambiguous figure such as
the Necker cube increases through an experimental session even
when breaks take place between blocks of trials.
Besides being manifest in the evolution of reversal rate, learn-
ing effects in bistable perception can determine which percept is
most likely to dominate. Chopin andMamassian (2012) tested the
dependency of the percept reported in a given trial of binocular
rivalry upon the exposure to unambiguous stimuli in the preced-
ing trials, across multiple time intervals. They observed negative
correlations across short intervals and positive correlations over
long intervals. They suggested that both adaptation and statistical
learning take place over different time frames, both contribut-
ing to bias perceptual dominance. Ocular dominance in binocular
rivalry can also show relatively enduring plasticity effects. Lunghi
et al. (2013) tested observers in a binocular rivalry setting after
150min of monocular patching. They found a relative increase in
the dominance duration for the deprived eye which endured for
at least 90min.
Haijiang et al. (2006) were able to show that observers can
be conditioned to use an otherwise irrelevant stimulus (e.g.,
stimulus position) as a cue to disambiguate an ambiguous SFM
stimulus. This effect might be mediated by relatively low-level
structures as the relevant position appears to be coded in a retino-
topic frame of reference (Harrison and Backus, 2010) and is still
lingering 4 weeks after training (Harrison and Backus, 2014).
On the other side, preexposure to the ambiguous stimulus can
block conditioning (Van Dam and Ernst, 2010). Conditioning
of one interpretation has also been observed for static stimuli
with an ambiguous three-dimensional structure (Jain and Backus,
2013).
TRANSIENT STATES OF THE OBSERVER AND AMBIGUOUS
PERCEPTION
VOLUNTARY CONTROL OF BISTABLE STIMULI
As noted in the introduction, a crucial query as to the issue
of cognitive influence on ambiguous perception is whether we
can exert some form of control over what is currently perceived.
This intriguing question appears to be inherently rooted in the
topic of bistable perception: for instance, Wheatstone himself
immediately after his first description of binocular rivalry noted
that the observer could not determine which stimulus was per-
ceived at will (Wheatstone, 1838). Instead, Helmholtz claimed he
could exert full control over both binocular rivalry and reversible
figures (Helmholtz, 1925) by paying attention to either of the
alternative interpretations. The question attracted the interest
of early prominent scholars: Hering (1964) and Breese (1899)
maintained that perceptual dominance during rivalry was sub-
stantially determined by eye movements and a similar point of
view was endorsed by Necker after his observation of the perspec-
tive reversibility of the wire cube (Necker, 1832). According to
Vicholkovska (1906), Wundt also sustained that the appearance
of geometric reversible figures (i.e., figures that can be reversed
on the basis of reference frame re-alignment, such as the Necker
cube) depended on eye movements. He even indicated the pre-
cise figural elements that needed to be fixated in order to obtain
a specific form of inversion, thus supporting a “physiological”
interpretation. Hering (1964) pointed out the role of low-level
stimulus features (such as changes in light and shade) in pro-
ducing inversions of geometric reversible figures and he also
noted that practice could produce accelerations in reversal rate:
he concluded that the phenomenal appearance of such figures was
largely under the observer’s volitional control.
Ever since these early debates, the issue of voluntary control
of ambiguous stimuli has recurrently attracted the interest of sci-
entists until today (e.g., Washburn and Gillette, 1933; Washburn
et al., 1934; Pelton and Solley, 1968; Lack, 1978; Peterson and
Hochberg, 1983; Struber and Stadler, 1999; Suzuki and Peterson,
2000; Toppino, 2003; Meng and Tong, 2004; van Ee et al., 2005;
Chong et al., 2005; Klink et al., 2008; Hugrass and Crewther,
2012; Stonkute et al., 2012). Among such studies a distinction can
be traced between the observers’ ability to switch between two
alternative percepts and the ability to hold either of the two in
visual awareness, as changes in reversal rate can occur without
variations in relative dominance of either percept (van Ee et al.,
2005).
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Control of reversal rate
There is overall agreement regarding observers’ capacity to con-
trol alternation rate across a large variety of bistable stimuli:
Pelton and Solley (1968) found that the instruction to switch
between alternative perspectives of the Necker cube as often as
possible yielded a significantly greater number of reversals than
the instruction to hold a perspective (any of the two) as long as
possible; Seth and Reddy (1979) also reported that observers were
able to comply with different task instructions about the reversal
rate of Vase-Face, Schröder Staircase and Reversible Book figures
(see Box 1); Rock et al. (1994) even proposed that observers do
not reverse ambiguous figures if their intention to do so is con-
trasted by a different intention (although different interpretations
of their findings are viable). George (1936) investigated the effects
of two drugs, caffeine and sodium amytal, on observers’ ability to
control the reversal rate of bistable figures and binocular rivalry:
he found that both drugs affected rivalry less than reversible figure
perception and that voluntary control of rivalry was possible, but
very limited compared to figure reversal. Meredith and Meredith
(1962) reported significant effects of different instructional con-
ditions on the alternation rate of binocular rivalry, an observa-
tion that subsequently found further empirical support (Lack,
1978; Meng and Tong, 2004; van Ee et al., 2005); Kohler et al.
(2008) investigated apparent motion perception (Figure 1H) and
described a halving in percept duration under the requirement to
switch as quickly as possible between alternatives as opposed to
passive viewing conditions.
However, voluntary control of reversal rate seems to be limited
both by physiological and stimulus constraints. On one hand, it
does not seem to be in the power of will to fully prevent alterna-
tions (but see Carter et al., 2005b for the effects of intensive and
prolonged meditation training on binocular rivalry in Buddhist
monks) and it is often hardly possible to precisely choose the
moment of reversal: as a matter of fact, phenomenal reversals
are physiologically bound to neural mechanisms of adaptation
and mutual inhibition between neural populations representing
alternative interpretations (e.g., Blake, 1989; Van Ee, 2009; Shpiro
et al., 2009; Seely and Chow, 2011). On the other hand, control of
alternation rates is related to the level of processing allowed by the
physical characteristics of the stimulus. For instance, within the
category of reversible figures, Struber and Stadler (1999) noted
that observers exerted greater control of alternation rates for those
stimuli whose ambiguity could be solved by reconstruction of
meaning rather than by reference frame re-alignment (e.g., the
duck/rabbit figure as opposed to the Necker cube, see Box 1).
In binocular rivalry, van Ee et al. (2005) reported greater abil-
ity to control higher level stimuli such as houses and faces than
sinewave gratings, and a recent study of Hugrass and Crewther
(2012) showed that whereas the reversal of stationary gratings
is resistant to voluntary control, the introduction of motion
information (both in the form of apparent and of real drift-
ing of the gratings) seems to enable the observers to generate
voluntary alternations. The authors maintained that this effect
cannot be attributed to the mere control of eye movements (at
least of saccadic ones) during the presentation of motion stim-
uli, because their frequency decreased when the experimental task
involved voluntary control of switches and because their rate did
not change at the time of perceptual reversals. However, one may
speculate that smooth pursuit movements could aid observers
in controlling perceptual alternations. Furthermore, Alais et al.
(2010) found that diverting attention to a secondary task slowed
perceptual alternations differently for different types of bistable
stimuli, with the Necker cube and house/face rivalry being more
amenable to attentional modulation than rivalry gratings.
Control of relative dominance
Certainly, the issue of mastery over ambiguous perception has
been explored not only in terms of reversal rate control, but also
in terms of the ability to maintain a specific percept in visual
awareness. This issue has been largely investigated by explic-
itly requiring participants to “hold” one of the two alternative
interpretations: this is one typical instruction employed to test
the effects of focused endogenous attention, but other instruc-
tional sets and experimental paradigms have been employedmore
recently and will be reviewed in the next section.
There is wide agreement on the observers’ capability to aug-
ment the proportion of time they perceive one of two alternatives,
as instructed, in the field of ambiguous figures. Experimental
reports of the effectiveness of the “hold” instruction have been
described for the Necker cube (Washburn and Gillette, 1933;
Washburn et al., 1934; Mull et al., 1952; Peterson and Hochberg,
1983; Gomez et al., 1995; Toppino, 2003; Kornmeier et al., 2009)
and for other perspective reversible figures (Washburn et al., 1934;
Liebert and Burk, 1985). Further efforts were made to demon-
strate that the effect of the instructional set is genuinely perceptual
rather than ascribable to response biases by employing revers-
ing stereograms (Peterson, 1986) and three-dimensional Necker
cubes (Hochberg and Peterson, 1987) as stimuli and recording
indirect measures that were perceptually coupled to the one of
interest. In the case of reversing stereograms, the viewer observed
through a stereoscope a stereo pair of images containing a central
square area that could appear in front of or behind the sur-
rounding area. The authors asked participants to hold one depth
organization and to respond about perceived depth directly or
indirectly via a judgment about (illusory) parallactic motion of
the central relative to the surrounding area. Since depth order-
ing and motion parallax are perceptually coupled, the systematic
covariation between the two kinds of responses was interpreted
against a post-percetual explanation of instructional set effects.
Likewise, in a three-dimensional rotating Necker cube the direc-
tion of motion (clockwise or counterclockwise) is perceptually
coupled with depth ordering: the relative shifting of the front
and rear faces of the cube defines clockwise or counterclock-
wise rotation (Hochberg and Peterson, 1987). The authors asked
participants to report the cube direction of rotation as an indi-
rect measure of perceived depth organization. The studies of
Peterson and colleagues also helped clarifying the relationship
between voluntary control of reversible perspective and fixation
of specific figural elements: although fixation instructions influ-
ence subjective reports, they cannot fully account for voluntary
control of perceptual dominance (Peterson and Hochberg, 1983;
Hochberg and Peterson, 1987), and neither can vergence eye
movements (Peterson, 1986). Furthermore, Peterson and Gibson
(1991) found that focusing spatial attention to subregions of
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the Necker cube can influence its perceived depth organization
regardless of fixation location when observers are required to
hold one interpretation. However, Toppino (2003) argued that the
effects of intention cannot be merely ascribed to the selection of
appropriate focal features within the stimulus for primary pro-
cessing. Other kinds of ambiguous stimuli have proven amenable
to voluntary control: Hol et al. (2003) examined ambiguous
structure-from-motion and noted that the orthographic projec-
tion of a rotating transparent cylinder leads to more perceptual
alternatives than have been classically studied. Besides a three-
dimensional cylinder revolving clockwise or counterclockwise,
observers were able to perceive two convex half-cylinders (and,
to a lesser extent, two concave ones) one in front of the other.
Importantly, the amount of time during which a certain per-
cept was present could be significantly biased by voluntarily
attending to it. Suzuki and Peterson (2000) investigated ambigu-
ous apparent motion stimuli that could be interpreted either as
translational or as expansion/contraction movements (Figure 1I)
and observed that voluntary control increased the probability to
see the instructed motion in a multiplicative way. The authors
manipulated stimulus eccentricity and orientation so as to favor
one interpretation under passive viewing conditions: they found
that the effect of intention was greater the stronger the con-
figuration bias. Similar dependencies between physical stimulus
parameters and strength of voluntary control were reported by
Brouwer and van Ee (2006) and by Klink et al. (2008) for ambigu-
ous structure-from-motion and binocular rivalry, so that Klink
et al. (2008) proposed a model to account for an early locus
of interaction between top-down control and sensory process-
ing, which would occur prior to the resolution of perceptual
conflict.
Voluntary control of dominance under “hold” instructions
has been reported also during binocular rivalry (Washburn and
Gillette, 1933; Collyer and Bevan, 1970; Lack, 1978; Meng and
Tong, 2004) and a series of studies conducted by Lack (1978)
ruled out that the effects of intention could be explained in terms
of mere control of accommodation, eye movements, eye blinks,
or pupil constriction. However, the ability to voluntarily control
rivalry seems to be somehow limited, especially if compared to
other instances of bistable stimuli (Washburn and Gillette, 1933;
George, 1936; Meng and Tong, 2004). Meng and Tong (2004)
compared observers’ performance during the display of binocular
rivalry and Necker cube stimuli: they found that observers could
effectively modulate reversal rate for both rivalry and the Necker
cube, but their control of rivalry dominance was very weak, at
variance with performance for the Necker cube. The authors con-
cluded that selective attentional control of rivalry is rather poor
and that mastery over reversal rate relies on strategies other than
selective attention.
VOLUNTARY ATTENTION
This section focuses on the effects of voluntary attention deploy-
ment on the perception of ambiguous displays, whereas the effects
of involuntary or exogenous attention will not be covered and
have been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., see Dieter and Tadin, 2011;
Paffen and Alais, 2011 for a discussion of the topic in the domain
of binocular rivalry).
Whether the deployment of attention can modify the appear-
ance of ambiguous stimuli is another topic that has attracted the
interest of scientists both in the past and in more recent times.
Maybe the first question to be addressed was whether a percept
could gain preferential access to consciousness if the observer
focused his/her attention on it (Helmholtz, 1925). Indeed, the
issues of voluntary control, intention, and endogenous selec-
tive attention are overlapping to a great extent (e.g., Suzuki and
Peterson, 2000; Meng and Tong, 2004) and have been typically
investigated by instructing observers to “hold” one of the alterna-
tive percepts, as reviewed above. However, endogenous selective
attention can be manipulated in different ways. For instance, Ooi
and He (1999) indicated to observers which stimulus to attend
to by means of a visual cue that was continuously visible and
occupied a different spatial location than the rival target: this pre-
vented suppression of the dominant eye when a transient stimulus
was displayed to the non-dominant eye, which otherwise typi-
cally occurs (Grindley and Townsend, 1965; Duensing andMiller,
1979; Ooi and He, 1999). More recent studies (Chong et al., 2005;
Chong and Blake, 2006; Hancock and Andrews, 2007) demon-
strated that requiring participants to track changes in one of the
rival stimuli impacts both initial selection (Chong and Blake,
2006) and rivalry dominance (Chong et al., 2005; Hancock and
Andrews, 2007), and does so in a way that can be likened to
increases in the cued stimulus contrast (Chong et al., 2005; Chong
and Blake, 2006). Interestingly, these findings match Helmholtz’s
observation that he could hold a rival stimulus dominant by
counting the lines present in its display.
Another way the allocation of attention may affect ambiguous
perception is by diverting cognitive resources to a concurrent task.
This issue was first studied in the domain of ambiguous figures:
Reisberg (1983) reported increased latencies of first reversals
when observers were engaged in a distractor task and Reisberg and
O’Shaughnessy (1984) further showed that withdrawing atten-
tion from the bistable stimuli slows reversal rates, thus indicating
that cognitive resources are implicated not only in the discov-
ery of the alternative construal, but also in the processes caus-
ing switches between the alternative interpretations. In another
experiment of their influential study about the effects of attention
on binocular rivalry, Ooi and He (1999) displayed a rectangu-
lar frame to one eye in order to direct attention on the framed
grating of the rivalry pair and asked participants to report the
color of the perceived grating: this kind of cuing was shown to
increase dominance of the cued eye in a previous experiment of
their study. They further required participants to perform a con-
current Vernier task at a different spatial location, and observed
that the dominance induced by the cuing procedure was strongly
reduced under divided attention conditions.More recently, Paffen
et al. (2006) found that diverting attention from binocular rivalry
to a concurrent visual task reduced alternations in a way that
was proportional to task difficulty and that mimicked the low-
ering of the rival stimuli contrast: they proposed that the effect of
attention on rivalry dynamics is indirect and achieved through
the enhancement of the effective contrast. Similar conclusions
were drawn by Paffen and Hooge (2011) in the context of dis-
tributed attention to multiple rivalry-inducing elements and, as
noted above, by Chong et al. (Chong et al., 2005; Chong and
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Blake, 2006) about the effects of endogenous selective attention
as elicited by a tracking task. Interestingly, Alais et al. (2010)
tested whether a slowing of reversal rate occurs when attention is
diverted to a concurrent auditory task and observed that the num-
ber of reversals decreased as a function of task difficulty, albeit at
a different rate for different kinds of bistable stimuli. This find-
ing favors an interpretation of the effect of diverted attention in
terms of a withdrawal of supramodal cognitive resources from
the perceptual task, rather than a sensory-specific phenomenon.
This is consistent with the aforementioned work of Reisberg and
colleagues on reversible figures (Reisberg, 1983; Reisberg and
O’Shaughnessy, 1984), which showed that alternation rates slow
and latencies of the first reversal increase when participants are
engaged in cognitive demanding task such as counting backwards
or memorizing digits for subsequent recall.
Analogous slowing of alternation rates has been reported for
reversible stereograms (Peterson, 1986), apparent motion (Kohler
et al., 2008), ambiguous structure-from-motion (Pastukhov and
Braun, 2007) and drifting plaids (Figure 1J, Pastukhov and
Braun, 2007) when attention is deployed to a concomitant task
at fixation. Pastukhov and Braun (2007) employed intermittent
presentation of stimuli, and found that reversals became less
frequent but still occurred when attention was prevented from
shifting to the ambiguous stimulus: the authors thus excluded
that attention is necessary to trigger phenomenal reversal. A neg-
ligible role of attention in triggering phenomenal reversals during
intermittent presentation of Necker lattices (i.e., grids made of
juxtaposed Necker cubes) has been evidenced also by Intaitè
et al. (2013). Instead, opposite conclusions have been drawn by
Brascamp and Blake (2012) in the field of binocular rivalry. The
authors employed a flash suppression paradigm to force visibil-
ity of one of the rival stimuli at the beginning of each trial and
then compared observers’ reports on rivalry after a delay dur-
ing which: (a) participants performed an attentionally demanding
task at fixation while the rivalry stimulus was still present on
screen, (b) participants performed the same demanding task in
the presence of non-rival stimulation, (c) participants monitored
rivalry disregarding the stimuli at fixation. They found a spillover
of the flash-suppression procedure on subsequent rivalry dom-
inance in (c) but not in (a) nor in (b): observers’ performance
was comparable when the rivalry stimulus was physically removed
and when it was unattended, thus suggesting that full atten-
tion withdrawal abolishes rivalry. The discrepancy between the
results of Pastukhov and Braun (2007) and Intaitè et al. (2013)
and the results of Brascamp and Blake (2012) could be due on
one hand to a difference between the types of stimuli induc-
ing the perceptual conflict; on the other hand, the experimental
manipulation disrupted visual awareness of the ambiguous stim-
uli in Brascamp and Blake’s, but not in Pastukhov and Braun’s
nor in Intaitè and colleagues’s study. Interestingly, Stonkute et al.
(2012) showed that the withdrawal of spatial attention can also
produce qualitative changes in the interpretation of a bistable
stimulus. The authors studied the impact of sudden inversions of
planar flow motion on the perception of ambiguous structure-
from-motion spheres: when all the dots composing the sphere
reverse their motion direction, the perceptual outcome could be
either an inversion of the illusory depth of each dot, with motion
direction being maintained, or an inversion of motion direction,
with conservation of illusory depth. When attention is diverted
to a demanding task at a different spatial location, reversals of
illusory motion drop in favor of reversals of illusory rotation.
VISUAL WORKING MEMORY AND IMAGERY
Experimental manipulations of voluntary attention and intention
have been by far the most studied ways to test how the state of the
observer can be transiently changed and how this change affects
ambiguous perception. One other remarkable and ever-changing
characteristic of the observer’s mental state are the contents of
working memory (WM). Visual WM is a crucial factor subtend-
ing visually guided behavior, and the effects of retaining a visual
stimulus in WM on the processing speed of images displayed
during the retention interval has been widely investigated (e.g.,
Downing, 2000; Robinson et al., 2008; Turatto et al., 2008; Pan
and Soto, 2010). More recently, the contents of working memory
have been shown to have a direct impact on how visual stimuli
appear to the observer: the storage of low-level visual features
in WM can produce systematic misperceptions of currently pre-
sented stimuli (Kang et al., 2011; Scocchia et al., 2013a). The effect
of visual WM contents on bistable perception, however, is not a
conclusive one. Rather, its impact seems to depend on the kind of
stimuli being investigated: Scocchia et al. (2013a) engaged partic-
ipants in a delayed discrimination task, asking them to memorize
the speed of an unambiguous structure-from-motion sphere, and
displayed an ambiguous sphere during the retention interval. The
perceived direction of motion of the ambiguously rotating sphere
was biased toward amatch with thememorized one. The situation
seems to be different for binocular rivalry, however, since holding
a visual item in WM was not sufficient to bias rivalry (Scocchia
et al., 2014). As one of the experiments described by Scocchia
et al. (2014) employed an experimental paradigm very similar
to the one of the structure-from-motion study (Scocchia et al.,
2013b), the divergent results are unlikely due to methodological
discrepancies. Rather, they could be ascribed to different neural
mechanisms involved in different kinds of ambiguous perception,
with binocular rivalry being based on competition at earlier stages
of visual processing. Indeed, explanations of binocular rivalry in
terms of early-level competition have met both empirical and the-
oretical consent (e.g., Blake, 1989; Haynes et al., 2005; Lee et al.,
2005; Seely and Chow, 2011) and, consistently with the outcome
of Scocchia and colleagues, previous studies comparing binocu-
lar rivalry to other instances of bistable perception showed less
amenability of rivalry to top-down modulation (i.e., Washburn
and Gillette, 1933; George, 1936; Meng and Tong, 2004).
The question as to whether memory and imagery can influ-
ence ambiguous perception was posed by Horliz and O’Leary
(1993) in the domain of figure-ground reversible figures. The
authors reported the effects of training participants to imagine
the alternative interpretation of a figure displayed with disam-
biguating cues on subsequent perception of reversible figures.
They observed that the results yielded by this training procedure
were comparable to those of a condition where participants were
exposed prior to testing to the different (disambiguated) alter-
natives of the same reversible figures employed during testing.
Both conditions differed in reversal rate and first reported percept
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from a control condition where participants received training
with ambiguous figures that were not employed during testing.
The authors discussed the data in terms of high-level contribu-
tions from imagery and memory to bistable perception. However,
given that imagery training was conducted on figure-ground
reversible stimuli other than the ones employed during testing
and that overall dominance was not affected by the experimental
manipulations, such contributions likely operated indirectly, with
participants learning how to switch between alternative interpre-
tations. Indeed, control of alternation rates can be improved by
training (e.g., Lack, 1978). More convincing evidence for a role
played by imagery in bistable perception has been obtained by
Pearson et al. (2008) in the domain of binocular rivalry. The
authors employed intermittent presentation of rivalry grating
stimuli, which is known to reduce the number of alternations thus
leading to perceptual stabilization (Leopold et al., 2002; Pearson
and Brascamp, 2008). Participants had to perform an imagery
task during the blank interval between subsequent rivalry pre-
sentations: they were required to visualize in the eye of their
mind either the stimulus that was dominant or the one that was
suppressed during the previous presentation.
This manipulation led to a disruption of perceptual stability
when the imagined grating matched the non-dominant one. The
effect was comparable to the one of faint physical stimulation dis-
played during the blank interval and increased as a function of the
temporal duration of the imagined or faint physical stimulus, in a
very similar fashion. Furthermore, the authors observed that the
impact of imagery on binocular rivalry is location and orientation
specific. These results may seem at odds with the ones of Scocchia
et al. (2014), who failed to observe visual WM effects on rivalry: if
on one hand such a discrepancy may be explained in terms of the
different perceptual dynamics underlying prolonged and contin-
uous vs. brief and intermittent rivalry presentation (Dieter and
Tadin, 2011), on the other hand the effects of visual WM and
imagery on binocular rivalry need not be the same. As a mat-
ter of fact, mental images can be evoked in the absence of any
sensory input (e.g., Kosslyn, 1973; Kosslyn et al., 2000), whereas
visual WM requires active encoding and maintenance of physi-
cal items in order to prevent memory decay (Baddeley, 2003).
Furthermore, there is evidence that dynamic visual noise (e.g.,
arrays of dots flickering at a predetermined rate and occupy-
ing random positions in the visual space) disrupts performance
during imagery but not visual WM tasks (Andrade et al., 2002;
Baddeley, 2007), and that TMS applied to V1/V2 brain areas can
selectively impair performance in visual WM but not in imagery
tasks (Cattaneo et al., 2009): this suggests that visual WM and
imagery may rely on different operating mechanisms that relate
to perception in different ways.
PRIOR HISTORY OF PERCEPTUAL DOMINANCE
Another important and thoroughly studied aspect of how
transient states may influence ambiguous perception is recent
stimulation and dominance history. Probably the most straight-
forward effect of recent stimulation on the dynamics of ambigu-
ous perception is the one of adaptation (i.e., repulsion toward
the opposite percept). However, if the repulsive effects of pro-
longed monocular adaptation (Blake and Overton, 1979; Blake
et al., 1990; van Boxtel et al., 2008) and of extended viewing
of unambiguous displays (Wolfe, 1984; Nawrot and Blake, 1989;
Petersik, 2002) on subsequent ambiguous perception have clearly
been established, the adaptation effects of subjective dominance
periods within conventional ambiguous displays have long been
elusive. In this case, one would expect dominance durations to
diminish after extended periods of dominance of the same per-
cept: yet, several studies that examined interdependence between
successive dominance epochs failed to observe significant corre-
lations (e.g., Fox and Herrmann, 1967; Lehky, 1995; Logothetis
et al., 1996). Only recently Pastukhov and Braun (2011) noted
that the cumulative history of past perceptual experience can
predict future dominance within the time frame of an exper-
iment with ambiguous displays: dominance durations of both
rivalry and ambiguous structure-from-motion show a robust
correlation with the integral of past perceptual states, weighted
toward the most recent states. In the domain of binocular rivalry,
Kang and Blake (2010) further showed that physically removing
the suppressed image and reintroducing it after a brief inter-
val increases its subsequent dominance durations: dominance
durations decrease monotonically as a function of adaptation
durations.
The dependency of current ambiguous perception from prior
history of perceptual dominance becomes evident when one con-
siders the effects of interleaving brief presentations of bistable
stimuli with blank periods of several seconds (Leopold et al., 2002;
Pearson and Brascamp, 2008): in these conditions, reversal rates
have been reported to slow by two orders of magnitude compared
to continuous viewing, meaning that a sensory trace of the image
is temporarily stored across presentations and helps stabilizing
the subjective appearance of a wide range of ambiguous stimuli.
Interestingly, this form of priming does not run out after each
single stimulus presentation, but builds up over time (Maloney
et al., 2005; Brascamp et al., 2008; Pastukhov and Braun, 2008).
For instance, Brascamp et al. (2008) interleaved intermittent and
continuous presentation of ambiguous stimuli with the aim to
disrupt stabilization during continuous viewing by means of
flash suppression: they found that, when intermittent presenta-
tion resumed, current dominance could be predicted on the basis
of the dominance ratio between percepts during the previous
minute of stimulus presentation. Likewise, Pastukhov and Braun
(2008) showed that perceptual stabilization of structure-from-
motion displays depends on an history of three or more domi-
nance periods. A further study of Brascamp et al. (2009) exam-
ined intermittent presentation of ambiguous stimuli on a longer
timescale than the ones usually reported in empirical research:
they observed that intermittent presentation, rather than defini-
tively stabilizing perception, produces reversals at fairly regular
intervals which seem to depend on the duration of the blank
period: the authors propose that intermittent presentation causes
a perceptual reversals cycle on amuch longer time scale compared
to the alternations observed during continuous presentation.
Finally, it should be noted that the effects of perceptual prim-
ing and adaptation might be underpinned by different neural
representations, as proposed by Pastukhov and colleagues to
account for their results (Pastukhov et al., 2013a, 2014). The
authors employed the same intermittent structure-from-motion
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display to test the effects of perceptual priming and adaptation
on the subjective appearance of the bistable stimulus: whereas
priming depended on the three-dimensional shape of the object
rather than on its volume, the opposite pattern of results was
observed for perceptual adaptation, which depended on the vol-
ume rather than on the shape of the object. The authors suggested
that the neural populations responsible for adaptation may be
localized relatively high in the visual processing hierarchy (i.e.,
area MST), so that they may code for illusory rotation in depth
without preserving information about shape.
MODELING AMBIGUOUS PERCEPTION: TOWARD
ACCOUNTING FOR THE IMPACT OF STABLE AND
TRANSIENT STATES OF THE OBSERVER
In principle, computational models can be formulated at very dif-
ferent levels of abstraction and with different goals in mind. At
one extreme end, simple phenomenological models may attempt
to describe certain aspects of the experimental data in a com-
pact and mathematically simple and elegant form. More detailed
mechanistic modelsmay try to establish a closer relationship to the
underlying neurophysiological mechanisms and may, e.g., utilize
complex networks of spiking neurons endowed with sophisticated
biophysical mechanisms. Finally, there are so-called normative
models, which try to relate the phenomenon in question to certain
optimality principles. In the context of ambiguous perception,
suchmodels may ask to what extent, e.g., the perceptual switching
may reflect an underlying optimal information processing strat-
egy. Importantly, there is no clear-cut distinction between these
different classes of models and any given model may carry aspects
of all three classes. What is common among all models is that they
try to describe and explain certain observed phenomena. In addi-
tion, they should generate testable predictions that can be used to
falsify them.
A GENERIC MODEL
We start our discussion by outlining a generic neuro-
computational model for ambiguous perception. Many concrete
instances and various extensions of this generic model have been
proposed over the years, which we will not review in detail (Lehky,
1988; Wilson et al., 2001; Laing and Chow, 2002; Wilson, 2003;
Seely and Chow, 2011). Instead, we will focus on a few recent
extensions of the generic model that have been introduced to
account for influences of stable and transient states of the observer
on ambiguous perception reviewed above. Finally, we highlight
some open questions and identify promising directions for future
research.
At the heart of the generic model are two or more compet-
ing neural populations whose activity is linked to the perception
of the different stimulus interpretations (Figure 3). For example,
a model of binocular rivalry may comprise two populations of
neurons corresponding to the perception of the stimuli presented
to the left and right eye. Importantly, the neural populations are
competing with one another in a “winner-takes-all” fashion. Only
one population can be highly active at a time and while it is active,
it suppresses activity in the other population. To achieve this fea-
ture, the generic model contains inhibitory couplings between the
neural populations representing the different perceptual alterna-
tives and utilizes non-linear properties of the neural populations.
This results in a multistable dynamical system where one pop-
ulation wins the competition and thereby signals the subject’s
perceptual interpretation of the stimulus.
To account for the spontaneous switching between different
perceptual alternatives, the generic model makes use of some
form of adaptation and noise. Adaptation can be thought of as a
slow mechanism of neuronal fatigue (time scale of seconds) that
leads to the winning population getting “tired” and reducing its
activity such that the other population can eventually take over.
At the neurophysiological level, this fatigue is thought to be due
to slow after-hyperpolarizing currents, but short-term depres-
sion of excitatory synaptic connections within the winning neural
population may also contribute to its demise.
Deterministic mechanisms for neuronal adaptation and
synaptic depression alone tend to produce regular oscillations
where one population suppresses the other for a fixed amount of
time before the other population takes over. Since such periodic
behavior is not seen experimentally, random noise is added to the
model to account for the stochasticity of perceptual switches. This
allows to describe the statistical distribution of dominance times,
which have been reported to approximately follow a Gamma
or lognormal distribution (e.g., Levelt, 1968; Lehky, 1988). The
neurophysiological basis of the noise is often assumed to be
intrinsic neural noise but also eye movements can be construed
as adding “noise.” Interestingly, Van Ee (2009) has shown that
adding noise to the adaptation dynamics of the neural popula-
tion can account for certain serial correlation data in dominance
durations. Many published models are consistent with or extend
FIGURE 3 | Sketch of the generic neuro-computational model.
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this admittedly rather vague description of a generic model and
they have accounted for a wide range of observed phenomena in
ambiguous perception (Lehky, 1988; Wilson et al., 2001; Laing
and Chow, 2002; Wilson, 2003; Seely and Chow, 2011). The
generic model is therefore a good starting point for consider-
ing influences of stable and transient states of the observer on
ambiguous perception.
THE ROLES OF NOISE, ADAPTATION, AND INHIBITION IN DRIVING
PERCEPTUAL SWITCHES
The relative importance of noise vs. adaptation for perceptual
switching has been discussed by several groups (e.g., Moreno-
Bote et al., 2007; Shpiro et al., 2009; Pastukhov et al., 2013b).
By performing a careful parameter analysis of various instances
of the generic model, Shpiro et al. (2009) and Pastukhov et al.
(2013b) have argued that the perceputal system is operating in
an intermediate regime where it is neither adaptation nor noise-
dominated. Specifically, Pastukhov et al. (2013b) observed that
model parameters fit to data from human subjects fell in a small
region of the parameter space largely overlapping with a the-
oretically determined “sweet spot,” where the model balances
perceptual stability with sensitivity to input modulations. Their
work represents an interesting step toward a normative account
of ambiguous perception.
An interesting variant of ambiguous perception uses stimuli
withmore than just two possible interpretations. Using such stim-
uli allows to go beyond the question of when a switch occurs to
also asking what the next percept will be, because now there is
more than one alternative to the currently perceived interpreta-
tion. Huguet et al. (2014) have recently presented a model for
tristable perception induced by plaid stimuli (Figure 1J). These
can be perceived as either a coherently moving plaid pattern or
as two semi-transparent gratings moving on top of each other
in different directions. Since either grating may be perceived as
lying on top of the other, there is a total of three different per-
cepts possible. Importantly, since perception can switch from
one interpretation to two distinct alternatives, the probability of
switching to one or the other can provide a separate window into
the mechanisms underlying ambiguous perception. They pro-
pose a model similar to the generic model outlined above but
with three competing neural populations corresponding to the
three perceptual interpretations: the model parameters are tuned
to fit data on dominance period durations and switch probabil-
ities. The authors conclude that the data are best accounted for
by a model where random fluctuations essentially determine the
dominance periods, but adaptation influences what percept will
dominate next. This somewhat contradicts some of the works
mentioned above which posit an important albeit not dominating
role of adaptation for the time course of percept switching.
Inhibition can also affect the timing of perceptual alternations.
By simulating a version of the generic model, Van Loon et al.
(2013) derived the prediction that increased inhibitory interac-
tions between the competing neural populations should lead to
slower perceptual switching. They then went on to test this predic-
tion experimentally. When estimating levels of GABA, the major
inhibitory neurotransmitter in the brain, in visual areas through
magnetic resonance spectroscopy, they found that GABA levels
were significantly negatively correlated with perceptual alterna-
tion rates as predicted by the model. Moreover, administration of
lorazepam which stimulates GABAA receptors was also found to
slow perceptual alternations.
The role of inhibition was also recently investigated by
Hoshino (2013), who proposed amodel to account for age-related
differences in perceptual switching. It has been known for a long
time that perceptual switching is slower in older adults compared
to younger adults. Hoshino’s model suggests that this difference
might be caused by age-related differences in the regulation of
GABA. Such modeling of the neural underpinnings of individual
differences in ambiguous perception or the role of other stable
states of the observer as discussed in Section Stable States of
the Observer and Ambiguous Perception are promising areas for
future research.
MODELING THE EFFECTS OF DOMINANCE HISTORY AND VOLUNTARY
CONTROL
A few attempts to model transient states of the observer have
been made for the effects of prior history of perceptual domi-
nance and for those of voluntary control. As to the former, the
empirical observation that interleaving briefly presented ambigu-
ous displays with blank intervals of several seconds substantially
slowed reversal rates, showed that successive dominance periods
are not independent of one another as was previously believed
(see Section Prior History of Perceptual Dominance). In the
context of intermittently presented ambiguous stimuli, stimulus
ON/OFF timing controls the generation of repeating, alternat-
ing or other more complex choice sequences. Noest et al. (2007)
have proposed a minimal model that captures a wide range of
these effects. Compared to the generic model outlined above, it
introduces an additional facilitatory mechanism. This facilitation
builds up with time to favor perceptual decisions upon stimulus
onset which are congruent with the recently perceived interpreta-
tion. A similar model byWilson (2007) uses a synaptic facilitation
mechanism for the same purpose. Brascamp et al. (2008) have
extended the model of Noest et al. (2007) by adding multiple
time scales of adaptation. This allows them to account for findings
in experiments with intermittently presented ambiguous stim-
uli demonstrating effects of prior dominance history extending
over minutes. A similar effect is obtained by an accumulating bias
in a simple descriptive model of Pastukhov and Braun (2008).
Their model does not explicitly represent the time varying activ-
ity of competing neural populations as the generic model does,
but is restricted to a simple description of how a bias for selecting
one percept over another is accumulating and decaying during
perception of either stimulus interpretation.
A model to account for the effect of voluntary control on
ambiguous perception has been put forward by Klink et al.
(2008). They introduce a two-stagemodel with two adapting neu-
ral populations at each of the two stages and cross-inihibition
between the two populations of the higher stage. Voluntary con-
trol is modeled as a simple multiplicative gain modulation of the
excitatory connections from the lower to the higher stage. Their
model is consistent with the idea that top-down attentional con-
trol over bistable stimuli may work by modulating the gain of
feature representations in early processing stages.
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Box 2 | Open Questions.
1. A common framework for the interpretation of individual differences in patients and in the general population. The stable
determinants of ambiguous perception have been mostly investigated in either pathological samples or in the general population, a striking
example in this sense being anxiety defined as a clinical condition or as a personality trait. It remains to be established whether common
mechanisms are at play in both cases, possibly investigating the inheritance of ambiguous perception patterns between healthy and
affected individuals, and investigating the effects of drugs on ambiguous perception in patients and in the general population.
2. Individual differences in the voluntary control of ambiguous perception. The individual differences in bistable perception have been
mostly studied in terms of the rate of switching between alternative percepts. However, there is growing evidence that observers have a
degree of control on what they perceive and for how long in an ambiguous display. It is largely unknown yet if there are stable individual
differences in the ability to voluntarily control the various aspects of bistable perception and whether they correlate with other individual
traits.
3. Cognitive strategies in voluntary control of reversal rate. The exertion of control on what is currently perceived can be mediated by
cognitive strategies or resources whose impact on ambiguous perception has traditionally been studied in isolation: for instance, voluntary
control could be achieved via the use of visual imagery strategies. Whereas efforts have been made to understand if and how observers
can maintain a specific perceptual alternative in visual awareness (see Section Voluntary Attention), how observers control the switching
between alternatives is still poorly understood.
4. Relationship between control of dominance and of reversal rate. After over a century of studies inquiring the possibility to exert
voluntary control on the perception of ambiguous stimuli, the relationship between control of relative dominance and of reversal rate still
needs to be specified. Is reversal rate increase attained via the voluntary discharge of an unwanted percept or rather observers are able
to bring up to consciousness the desired percept? Likewise, do observers achieve control of relative dominance by voluntarily shortening
the dominance period of an unwanted percept or by lengthening the duration of the desired one? What is the relationship between the
mechanisms that regulate the control of dominance and of reversal rate? Or is it one and the same mechanism that accounts for both
forms of control exertion on ambiguous perception?
5. Transient factors influencing learning of ambiguous displays. Learning effects on ambiguous perception likely rely on some form of
visual memory and may be influenced by prior history of perceptual dominance. Specifying how different transient aspects may support
much longer-lasting perceptual learning effects would help unraveling the functional and neural underpinnings of ambiguous perception.
6. The role of noise and its relationship with voluntary control of reversal rate.Much work in the modeling domain has emphasized the
role of noise in switching between perceptual alternatives, since adaptation and mutual inhibition between competing neural populations
are not enough to explain them on a physiological basis. However, the neurophysiological origin of this noise remains elusive. Does it
reflect stochastic processes at the synaptic or neuronal level, or does it reflect an underlying chaotic dynamics of neural populations?
Furthermore, is this “noise” modulated during the exertion of cognitive control on what is perceived?
7. The quest for an overarching computational framework.While computational models have managed to describe and mechanistically
explain a range of fundamental phenomena related to ambiguous perception, it is still unclear to what extent these phenomena might
reflect an optimal information processing strategy. To answer this question, future modeling work should attempt to relate successful
phenomenological and mechanistic models to normative theories of perception as a form of optimal inference. The resulting framework
would be a solid foundation for studying the various transient and stable effects on ambiguous perception.
Overall, the generic model and its recent extensions have been
quite successful in describing fundamental aspects of ambigu-
ous perception and offering plausible accounts for the underlying
neural mechanisms, covering many of the phenomenological and
mechanistic aspects of the problem. So far, however, only few of
the various stable and transients influences on ambiguous percep-
tion have been modeled. We identify this as a promising area for
future research.
TOWARD NORMATIVE ACCOUNTS OF AMBIGUOUS PERCEPTION
Another opportunity results since only little work has attempted
to develop normative accounts of ambiguous perception phe-
nomena. An adequate framework for this might be to treat
ambiguous perception as just a special case of a generic process
of statistical inference. Early on, Dayan (1998) already pointed
out that the stochastic nature of switches in binocular rivalry
might be related to some form of sampling-like statistical infer-
ence procedure. As sampling theories are gaining momentum in
Neuroscience (Hoyer and Hyvärinen, 2003; Lee and Mumford,
2003; Shi and Griffiths, 2009; Fiser et al., 2010), it will be interest-
ing to see if the diverse phenomenology of ambiguous perception
can be seen as a reflection of an underlying approximately opti-
mal statistical learning and inference mechanism. In this context,
Hohwy et al. (2008) review binocular rivalry from the perspective
of predictive coding, which assumes that lower level process-
ing stages only signal differences between bottom-up inputs and
top-down predictions to the next higher processing stage. Some
concrete models that use sampling-based inference ideas tomodel
ambiguous perception have been presented by Sundareswara and
Schrater (2008), Buesing et al. (2011), andGershman et al. (2012).
Future modeling work should aim to develop a synthesized
view of ambiguous perception that reconciles such normative
approaches with detailed mechanistic and simpler phenomeno-
logical descriptions. It will then be interesting to see how the
various stable and transient influences on ambiguous perception
can be accounted for in the context of such models.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The truthfulness of the outside world, as it appears to the viewer’s
eye, is hardly ever questioned by the man in the street. Despite
the apparent coincidence between the phenomenal and the phys-
ical world, it is now evident that the world as we perceive it
is the result of a complex process of inference operated by the
brain. Whenever we face noisy, feeble or ambiguous visual stim-
ulation, the outcome of this process is determined by the state
of our perceptual and cognitive system, which, in turn, is the
result of both the evolution of our species, the learning that
took place during our lifespan, the recent stimulation we received
and our current goals. The perception of ambiguous stimuli
is thus an invaluable tool for the scientist aiming to explore
the determinants of perception. In this contribution we tried
to provide a comprehensive overview of the studies that inves-
tigated how the state of the observer can affect the perception
of ambiguous stimuli. We reviewed both classical studies and
recent contributions, and addressed different types of bistable
perception, from reversible figures to binocular rivalry (exam-
ples are reported in Figure 1 and Box 1). We described a large
spectrum of phenomena set to multiple time-scales, spanning
from the effects of gender, handedness and genetic background,
that characterize individual performance through a lifetime and
beyond, to the effects of adaptation and attention, whose duration
is in the range of seconds (Figure 2). Furthermore, we covered
both aspects that act on perception at a physiological level, such
as individual differences associated with the functioning of the
neurotransmitter systems, and aspects that act at much higher
level of processing, such as the contents of working memory
and imagery. Finally, we reviewed current models of ambigu-
ous perception that may conciliate the impact of the state of
the observer. The available theoretical models mostly account for
the low-level aspects of ambiguous perception and have focused
on binocular rivalry as a paradigmatic example. Whether these
models, and more generally the framework of the generic model
outlined above (Figure 3), apply to the different kinds of ambigu-
ous perception, including reversible figures, is an intriguing and
yet unanswered question. Ultimately, the range of phenomena
in ambiguous perception is wide enough to confront the idea
that they could be accounted for within a unique framework: the
challenge to face is integrating different gradients of top-down
modulation in a simple, physiologically plausible framework. In
this respect, assessing the impact of stable and transient states
of the observer is crucial to the understanding of ambiguous
perception as a whole: amenability to top-down modulation of
different kinds of bistable stimuli allows to identify the level of
processing at which competition between different representa-
tions occurs and helps pinpointing the mechanisms underlying
such competition. In principle, different levels of top-down mod-
ulation, from stable individual differences and clinical conditions,
to the aspects related to meaning and semantics, to the impact of
more volatile cognitive factors, such as attentional deployment,
may be modeled as acting at different levels of perceptual pro-
cessing: a comprehensive explanation of ambiguous perception
should integrate the important share played by the state of the
observer.
The impact of the observer on what is perceived is indeed a
very complex subject matter, which has been addressed from dif-
ferent viewpoints: up to now, the various aspects whose effect on
ambiguous perception we reviewed have typically been studied
in isolation. However, it is very plausible that at least some of
these aspects exert a convergent influence on ambiguous percep-
tion: for instance, statistical learning of ambiguous displays likely
relies on some form of visual memory, whereas visual imagery
may be employed to exert voluntary control on what is currently
perceived. Clarifying how these aspects interact would improve
our understanding not only of ambiguous phenomena, but of the
principles of perception overall. In our opinion, it is now time
for an integrative approach to subjective influences on ambigu-
ous perception (see Box 2), both in terms of topics and of means
of investigation.
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